

What are the Security and Resilience Implications of Brexit?

Context

London First surveyed our members shortly after the EU referendum result. The survey told us that 31% of members think dealing with the consequences of the EU vote should be our top priority.

Following on from this over the summer we ran a series of Brexit breakfasts to understand in more detail what London business sees as the opportunities and threats from the Brexit process; to get a sense of what matters most to business in a final deal with the EU; and, to determine what value London First can add in achieving the best outcome for London. The Security & Resilience Network's work fits within this broader London First programme.

This report is the first in a series of papers on the security and resilience implications of Brexit focusing on the considerations for the private sector in London and beyond. The report provides an overview of the top-level issues and offers a focused analysis of the challenges and opportunities presented by the EU referendum on 23 June 2016.

The report advances initial discussions that took place at a meeting organised by the Security & Resilience Network of London First on 21 July. A report on the proceedings, which took place under the Chatham House rule, was issued with the title of 'The Security and Resilience Implications of Brexit'.¹ The audience, then and now, is senior executives in the public and private sectors who need to grapple with the issues presented by Brexit. It concludes with 10 recommendations for consideration as we move forward under the new set of circumstances.

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The Security and Resilience Implications of Brexit

Introduction

The outcome of the EU referendum in the UK on 23 June 2016 has required leaders across all domains to sit up and take note of the potential impact of Brexit; the security sector – whether publicly or privately owned – is no exception. The economic and political uncertainty created has inevitably raised many questions. This uncertainty comes at a time when the UK is also facing a heightened threat of terrorism, presenting yet further challenges.

Many leading national security figures argued that Brexit would compromise the UK's ability to fight cross-border crime and terrorism.² Although Downing Street has not commented on whether Britain would stay in Europol for instance, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, has said that 'the aim is to preserve the relationship with the EU on security matters as best we can.'³ The new Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, has declared that she will be having discussions about how to continue some form of involvement within the agencies of the EU that help keep us safe.⁴ What is more, the Prime Minister at the Conservative Party Conference on 2 October indicated a clear desire for continuing co-operation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism work.⁵ However, this subject, like many others, will not be known one way or the other for some time to come.

The National Security Context

The UK's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review was published in November 2015, shortly after the Paris terrorist attacks.⁶ It judges the following to be the 'Tier One' risks to the UK over the next five years: terrorism, cyber threats, international military conflict, instability overseas, public health threats and major natural hazards. Over the longer term, changes in technology and the geopolitical and global economic context are identified as being the main drivers of the impact and likelihood of risk.

The UK's relationship with the EU is dealt with in a somewhat cursory manner within the Strategy, perhaps on account of the uncertainties associated with the referendum. It does, however, refer to the security and defence capabilities and objectives of the EU, as set out in its Common Security and Defence Policy, as being complementary to those of NATO, including sanctions, missions (military and civilian), and security and development support worldwide. It claims a leading role for the UK in shaping these, including: Operation Atalanta, the EUNAVFOR mission off the coast of Somalia; Operation Sophia, which addresses people smuggling in the Mediterranean; and Operation Althea, which provides capacity-building and training in the Balkans.

Importantly, the Strategy makes commitments to maintaining its NATO and UN targets on defence and development spending, and increasing spending on counter-terrorism policing and aviation security. This reflects a marked turnaround from the 2010 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review which made substantial cuts to public spending on defence and security.

The UK's current terrorism threat level has been placed at 'Severe' since August 2014 because of the threat from militant groups in the Middle East. A recent Europol report indicates that in 2015 a total of 151 people died and over 360 were injured as a result of terrorist attacks in the EU.⁷ Six EU Member States (Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK) faced 211 failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks. In the UK, a man was seriously injured in a knife attack last December at an Underground station in Leytonstone, London, which was labelled as a terror attack because the attacker reportedly shouted 'This is for Syria' during the incident. Incidents in 2016 have included two suicide bombings in Brussels Airport and one bombing in the Brussels Metro in March (35 killed, 300 wounded), and three attacks in France: knife killings of a police officer and his wife in Magnanville in June, a vehicular attack in Nice during the Bastille day celebrations on 14 July (84 killed, 202 injured), and the knife murder of a priest in Rouen on 26 July.

In late May, the new Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, appointed Lord Harris of Haringey to undertake an independent review of London's preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. Due to report very shortly, Lord Harris is examining the capability, capacity and collaboration arrangements of response agencies, looking at their ability to cope with multiple simultaneous incidents. The review covers the Metropolitan Police, including its armed response capacity, as well as other police services operating in London, including: the British Transport Police and City of London Police; the London Fire Brigade; the London Ambulance Service; local government; Transport for London and the Port of London Authority. In early August, following the French attacks, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe and the Mayor announced plans to increase the number of armed police to be deployed across London, in order to reassure the public and deter attackers following terrorist attacks in Europe.

Furthermore, the Home Office is soon to announce the latest revision of the UK's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST). This will be the fourth revision, the last being published in July 2011. CONTEST is currently based around four key objectives: pursue (to stop terrorist attacks); prevent (to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism); protect (to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack); and prepare (to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack).⁸ As these objectives have been found to be robust since CONTEST's inception, they are likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future. What can be expected in the revision, and would be welcomed, is mention of a greater degree public- and private-sector engagement to tackle violent extremism. There is much to be gained from, and offered by, the corporate world through an exchange of

information on matters that can help prevent or mitigate acts of terrorism. It would therefore be beneficial if the public and private sectors could develop a mechanism and machinery through which this exchange could take place through the close engagement of government and business representatives in genuine partnership.

At the European level, the European External Action Service published on 28 June a new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, updating the security strategy for the EU for the first time since 2003, and recognising that the security challenges for today's Europe have global implications and require global solutions.⁹ The Strategy emphasises the challenges to the cohesion of the Union itself, as well as the wider threats facing EU countries from within and outside its borders, and argues for greater collaboration and action across a range of dimensions. Prior to this, on 28 April 2015 the European Commission set out a European Agenda on Security concerned with the collective capability of Member States to respond to terrorism and security threats and calling for a more co-ordinated approach over the period 2015 to 2020 across a number of dimensions.¹⁰ The priorities identified are tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation, disrupting organised crime, and fighting cybercrime. In April 2016 the Commission published a strategic note advocating a Security Union – a common European approach – to deliver this.¹¹

These ongoing developments within the EU are important as the UK considers the terms of the working relationship on security matters that it would like to negotiate. Notably in early August, following the resignation of the UK's High Commissioner Jonathan Hill, it was announced that Sir Julian King, the British Ambassador to France, would be given the role of 'Commissioner of the Security Union', with the responsibility for establishing more co-ordination across all stages of investigation, law enforcement and criminal proceedings. This role was allocated by the President of the European Commission and approved by the Council of the EU.

Sir Julian King's remit covers the co-operation of Member States' intelligence services, police forces, and judicial authorities as well as the work of EU agencies Europol (the EU law-enforcement agency), Eurojust (with judicial co-operation in criminal matters), EU INTCEN (the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, an intelligence body) and Frontex (the EU border management agency). Other important dimensions of European security co-operation are the Schengen Information System (SIS II), an EU-wide means of sharing information to assist law enforcement and border control, and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), a mechanism by which individuals wanted in relation to significant crimes are extradited between EU member states to face prosecution or serve a prison sentence for an existing conviction.

Sir Julian's appointment plays to the UK's strengths in counter-terrorism and may indicate a desire within the EU to retain strong links with the British security services. It can certainly be concluded that, due to the transnational and worsening nature of the current terrorist threat, more rather than less security co-operation at the European level will be necessary, whatever the terms of that co-operation might be. Notably, co-operation between Europe's security and intelligence agencies has strengthened since the Paris attacks last November, through the Counter Terrorism Group, an informal grouping of agencies from all EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland, which has recently established a virtual platform for exchanging information on individuals in Europe who have joined jihadist organisations.



A challenge for the UK in the coming months will be to decide whether to seek to remain part of Europol, which may include signing up to new regulations that will give MEPs greater powers of scrutiny over Europol and encourage national governments to share more information with it, or opting out and lose access to its hundreds of criminal databases.^{12 13} Also in question will be the UK's continuing access to the EAW which is based on mutual recognition of member states' judicial systems. Any loss of Europol's security resources and connectivity will make the UK more reliant on bilateral collaboration with Member States, which would be considerably more complex and time-consuming.

As the UK Government considers the nature and degree of security co-operation at the European level that it wishes to retain, it must address uncertainty at home about the regional security consequences of Brexit for the UK, with respect to the stability and border arrangements for Northern Ireland and the future status of Scotland. It faces the challenge of maintaining its commitment to increasing defence and security spending in less certain economic conditions.

Corporate Contribution and Preparedness

It is the hope that because security and resilience are such important aspects of the global common security aims, security will sit outside of the political and trade arrangements and Brexit should have limited impact on these shared priority areas: the safety and wellbeing of people should be above all else. With this in mind, security, risk management, safety, intelligence sharing, crime prevention, investigations and resilience will continue to be robust and existing arrangements maintained albeit in a suite of changed operating models.

Security and risk issues such as crime and terrorism have always possessed transnational characteristics with shared issues prevalent from one country to the next and so this will continue although there is an underlying expectation that the UK will exert more control over its own borders. There does, however, remain a distinct possibility that continental support to prevent illegal immigration to the UK from neighbouring EU countries such as France will be decreasingly prioritised.

Chief Security Officers (CSOs) in the UK will no doubt have other issues to contend with within their own organisations as Brexit is set to change operating and delivery models across nearly all sectors of business. The role, responsibility and job specification for a CSO will not change significantly, irrespective of which industry they work in, but there are likely to be substantial changes in other areas of commerce, trade and politics.

There could be a financial impact on security budgets but the CSO must remain pragmatic and focus resources on those areas that are most needed and offer the very best return on investment. There will be many opportunities to innovate new ideas and to integrate existing systems and practice and gain support for more refined and beneficial operating security strategies and behaviours.

Despite the potential risks to UK security provision associated with Brexit, it will almost definitely mean change. These changes should be embraced and measures implemented that compliment whatever the changes are.

C-suites need to listen to their CSOs and be reassured that despite all other changes that will happen across the business as a result of Brexit, the security of the organisation will be in safe hands. There remains significant uncertainty for UK CSOs but sound security practice will remain no matter what the political or trade circumstances are. Prior to Brexit, UK CSOs will need to ensure that appropriate security measures are in place across their organisations to reflect evolving needs. Initiatives such as the UK Government's 'Stay Safe' campaign as well as Projects Griffin and Argus can all help in this regard.¹⁴

The ever changing role of the CSO means that they must continue to become more outward facing, with strong, global networks and capabilities, in order to remain effective.

Risks to Security Information Sharing

The UK's decision to relinquish its EU membership poses a serious risk that the country's policing and security agencies will experience reduced access to many, if not all those security-related information sharing initiatives that have developed over many decades within the confines of the EU. Whilst the impact on business of this detachment is arguably one step removed, it is nevertheless a concern that new barriers may emerge, in an already complex security landscape, to the ease at which UK agencies may be able to share intelligence and information with their continental partners. As has already been covered above, the transnational character of many of the security threats facing the UK today means that there is a premium on effective, transnational co-operation amongst like-minded allies.

Of greatest concern, perhaps, is the prospect that the UK's withdrawal from the EU may mean that its day-to-day involvement in Europol and access to its associated initiatives (such as co-operation with partners on the EAW) are substantially reduced, if not potentially removed. This would be an unwelcome development because, recognising that the effectiveness of such structures as Europol can always be strengthened, UK plc benefits substantially from the police intelligence and information that flows from participation in the umbrella organisation. Indeed, the UK has been a leading contributor to, and beneficiary of, Europol. It has committed considerable effort and resources to improving its structure and operation, yielding substantial benefits for UK security and policing, and benefits from a Briton, Rob Wainwright, having being Director of Europol since 2009.

The irony is that, to date, the UK has arguably been the leading contributor in the development of pan-European, non-military security policies through the EU, exerting its influence to ensure that Europe's civilian security responses are as effective as possible. The UK's strong role in the creation of the EU's counter-terrorism strategy (largely based on the UK's CONTEST approach) and the development of the EU's aviation security regime (developed with strong involvement of British MEPs) are but two examples, indicating the clear value of the contribution.

The concern of business in London and beyond includes a focus on the possibility that, by choosing to leave the EU, the UK may have placed itself in the position where it is able to exert less political influence on the shape and direction of future EU policies. This is a practical, hard-headed concern over the country's future ability to affect the direction of the multiple areas of policy that European countries have opted to co-operate on through the EU, and not 'talking the country down', as some might see it.

Need for Improved Collaboration

The UK's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review stresses the linkage between national security and a successful economy. Without a secure and stable environment, business cannot thrive to make the economy successful and, importantly, become resilient to shocks and stresses; Brexit is no exception to this rule. The breadth and span of current shocks and stresses are unprecedented and there is no likelihood that the pace of change will lessen. Yet, present policies, programmes and resources are arguably more suitable for past experiences of threats than current reality. Fighting old battles is a common feature attributed to generals. This notwithstanding, any revised approach to preparedness and planning will clearly not be effective without resource reinforcement and / or a reallocation of priorities through greater collaboration.

One area that deserves attention in a post-Brexit world is collaboration to achieve a better exchange of information between the public and private sectors. A national debate is now urgently needed on whether this should go further than a simple dialogue between the government and the private sector on sharing of information on a voluntary basis. Some argue that it should ideally be 'enshrined in law along the lines of the US legislation and practices, as well as good practices found in Germany and Estonia, and the principles of the EU's Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) should be embraced'.¹⁵ What is more, UK business overseas does not have security support such as that provided by the US Department of State via, for example, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) initiative. It is a fact that much EMEA business activity is headquartered in London and London acts as the point of origin for much UK business activity and travel overseas.

The UK Government is often accused of being reluctant and too slow in sharing information / intelligence.¹⁶ The revelations of the PRISM surveillance programme of the US National Security Agency and the WikiLeaks disclosures of classified government information focused attention on the difficulties of where to draw the lines between 'the need to know' and the 'need to share' information/intelligence: and the balance between the needs to be better managed.¹⁷ If the UK economy is to thrive post-Brexit then it is imperative that the balance is addressed and the private sector given a better steer on where to look for upcoming threats and lessons from past events that affect business. The need is for information (upon which business can act) over intelligence (for the sake of knowing privileged details).

In addition to the value the UK receives from participation in EU-wide, public-sector security mechanisms for co-operation and information sharing, several EU structures facilitate public-private security co-operation more directly; it will be important to ensure that the important capabilities arising for the UK from such initiatives are not lost. The government's current assumption appears to be that, insofar as UK involvement in EU security institutions is concerned, the UK has a lot to offer the EU, and vice versa, but the manner of the co-operation may

be altered substantially. Industry in the UK would welcome clarity, at the earliest opportunity, around whether ongoing engagement with European partners will be possible within the confines of the relevant Justice and Home Affairs initiatives, such as the work of Europol, Horizon 2020, and the proposed Security Union, amongst others.¹⁸ The government's stated commitment to underwrite the funding arising from these initiatives is extremely welcome, mitigating for the business community some of the uncertainty that has arisen. However, arguably as equally valuable would be an ongoing ambition to ensure that, as it negotiates a EU-UK deal for the future basis of co-operation, there will be opportunities for UK business to co-operate with partners within the frameworks that have developed, at minimum on an associate basis.

This is perhaps most relevant in respect of ensuring ongoing access to the public-private security co-operative structures that are emerging within the confines of the EU to strengthen European cyber security. In our view, cross-border public-private cyber security co-operation will help to counter the blight of industrial-scale online criminality now affecting European economies. It is in this context that, from an industrial perspective, there should be a strong emphasis in the UK Government's upcoming negotiations on ensuring that there is an appropriate level of UK access to, and involvement in, the EU's work emerging work in this areas, including that of the European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) within Europol. Whilst the work of this relatively new institution is at an early stage, the obvious transnational characteristics of this growing problem mean that the UK should seek to work as closely as ever with its European partners, if not even more so. Bearing in mind the value (stated above) that arises from the public-sector co-operation that the UK receives from participation in Europol, the UK Government should seek to ensure full ongoing participation in Europol on, at minimum, its work on counter-terrorism, organised crime and cyber insecurity.

Regulation and Legislation

Notwithstanding Brexit, there are two major changes in EU legislation that are likely to have significant implications for the corporate sector: the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the NIS Directive. Both of these are set to come into full force in May 2018. At that time, the UK will still be a full member of the EU and therefore expected to abide by the requirements of these measures; even after Brexit, it is likely that companies will be expected to meet the standards set by these measures if they wish to continue to operate in the single market or trade with EU countries.

The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) has provided an overview of the GDPR which contains useful advice on the requirements of the regulation. The GDPR uses a more extensive definition of personal data than the Data Protection Act – for example, an IP address may count as personal data if it can be uniquely assigned to a person. The main changes from existing data protection regulation

concern breach notification and accountability. The former places greater legal liability on the processors of personal data if they are responsible for a breach. The latter requires that organisations are able to demonstrate how they comply with the principles of data protection. The GDPR also strengthens the rights of individuals, in particular the right to erasure and the right to data portability. The former is the much discussed 'right to be forgotten'. Under the Data Protection Act, this right to be forgotten was restricted to situations where the processing caused substantial and unwarranted damage and distress; this threshold no longer applies under the GDPR. Data Portability allows individuals to obtain and use their personal data across different services – an example of this is Midata in the banking and finance sectors. The GDPR also introduces a tiered approach to financial penalties which, for the most severe infringements amount to fines up to the maximum of 4% of worldwide turnover or €20 million and a lower tier of fines up to the maximum of 2% of worldwide turnover or €10 million. It remains to be seen whether the EU will actually impose such punitive fines.

The latest text of the NIS Directive is available from EUR-Lex¹⁹ which provides direct free access to EU law, as well as the treaties, legislation, case-law and legislative matters. The EU has identified the resilience and stability of network and information systems as being essential for the completion of the Digital Single Market. There is currently a fragmented approach across the EU with Member States being at different levels of capabilities and preparedness. The NIS Directive aims to rectify this situation by establishing a level playing field. The Directive has three main objectives:

- all the Member States should ensure that they have a minimum level of national capabilities in place;
- the competent authorities, established as part of the first point, should co-operate within a network enabling secure and effective co-ordination, including co-ordinated information exchange as well as detection and response at the EU level; and
- the Directive aims to ensure that a culture of risk management develops and that information is shared between the public and private sectors.

The main implications of this Directive fall on operators of essential services and digital service providers through the establishment of common minimum capacity building and planning requirements, exchange of information, co-operation and common security requirements. The NIS Directive includes an obligation of incident notification to a national competent body – presumably CERT UK (to be part of new National Cyber Security Centre, NCSC) for London-based organisations. The process of preparing for the implementation of the Directive by identifying essential services is expected to start in February 2017.

Industry would also welcome clarity on how future application in the UK of EU-wide, security-related single market regulation (such as, for example, the EU's common aviation security rules and counter-terrorist financing measures) may be affected by the UK's upcoming membership withdrawal. It should be noted that, to date, the UK has been a leading, active contributor to the development of industry-related EU security legislation, and that concerns would therefore arise if the country became less influential in helping to set and shape the European security agenda. While contributors to this paper do not see this as an inevitable outcome, there is now an imperative, perhaps through the planning process for the proposed Security Union under development, to ensure that the UK's valuable contributions to European-wide security – and in particular its associated legislative measures – are maintained as far as possible.

Innovation and Research

Maintaining an innovative knowledge economy and solving today's challenges in areas such as security, health, energy and environment require global collaboration. According to the UNESCO Science Report: towards 2030, the EU is the world leader in terms of its global share of science researchers (22.2%), ahead of China (19.1%) and the US (16.7%), while the UK (with 0.9% of the world's population) has 3.3% of the world's scientific researchers, producing 6.9% of global scientific output. When researchers and entrepreneurs pool expertise and resources they can achieve much more than they can do alone.

The EU has tripled its research and innovation budget over the last decade while UK investment in these areas has shrunk to 0.55% of GDP, the average among other advanced countries being 0.8%. The EU's current seven-year research and innovation programme, Horizon 2020, facilitates international co-operation and is funded to €80 billion. The UK, which contributes about 11.5% of the EU budget, has received €6.1 billion or 15.4% of the Horizon 2020 funds allocated to date, and secures about 16% of all EU research and innovation funding.

In the previous programme, FP7, running from 2007 to 2013, the UK had over 17,000 participations including five of the top 10 academic participants and two of the top 10 SME participants, with UK participants holding the top position in both lists. The UK submitted over 14,000 responses to the first 100 calls of Horizon 2020 (the highest of all Member States), participated in the most signed grant agreements of any Member State and received the second largest share of funding after Germany.

Other sources of public funds for research and innovation are: Innovate UK, the UK Government's agency for innovation funding in business, with a budget of £561 million for 2016-17; the R&D Tax Credits scheme administered by HMRC which provides nearly £2 billion per annum to UK businesses performing research and development activities; and the Research Councils UK annual research funding programme of about £3 billion per year.



In providing a one-stop shop for funding and bringing researchers and entrepreneurs together from across Europe and beyond, the EU adds a layer of capacity that the UK could not replicate on its own. As yet, there are no guarantees that money not spent on the EU budget would be invested in UK research and innovation. Although the Treasury has announced that all grant agreements signed up to the point of Brexit will be funded, UK partners are no longer seen as being as attractive as they were before the 23 June vote. The university sector considers the dynamic of European co-operation that underpins the UK's track record in winning research and innovation funding to be seriously at risk. This risks the loss of much top talent and has implications for the quality of the UK's research, innovation and education, and the general standing of its universities in international rankings.

All of the leading universities in the world are characterised by the international character of their staff and students. Our leading universities employ staff who are the best in the world at what they do, regardless of nationality. Many departments have a high percentage of academic staff from other Member States; the Brexit vote has created a lot of uncertainty for these staff and there is anecdotal evidence that promising young researchers from Europe and elsewhere have been declining job offers.

Community Safety and Resilience

The referendum environment has brought about new domestic security challenges. The murder of Jo Cox MP a week before the referendum itself (allegedly by an attacker shouting 'Britain first' or 'Put Britain first') has been followed by a spike in hate crimes, physical attacks on foreign nationals (including the murder of the Polish worker Arkadiusz Jozwik in Harlow, Essex on 27 August) and internet trolling against prominent pro-EU campaigners and politicians: the last of these activities is an ongoing problem.

Figures for the two weeks around the vote showed that 3,076 hate crimes and incidents were reported to police across the UK. This compares with an increase of 915 (42%) compared with last year according to the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC).²⁰ In London alone, the Metropolitan Police said that they had made 400 arrests for suspected hate crimes following the referendum.²¹ The Concluding Remarks of a recent report by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated that the campaign had been marked by 'divisive, anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric'.²² The report went on to say that many politicians and public figures had not only failed to condemn such language but also had encouraged it by stoking prejudices. These challenges have the potential to affect community cohesion, will require strategies to address community divisions, and need to be recognised as a prospective threat to community resilience - all important elements in the UK's capacity to address the threat of terrorism.

Immigration, both legal and illegal, was a key issue in the Brexit campaign. The motives were and remain complex. For whatever reasons given, some people blame foreigners for their own ills. This inevitably generates ethnic and community tensions and feeds xenophobia. This in turn creates populism, nationalism and extremism unless checked. It is a trend that is not unique to Brexit and the UK. Other countries, including the US where 'Americanism' is a growing refrain, are experiencing the same popular shift. Successes for the AfD party in Germany in the Autumn 2017 and the Front National in France in the Spring could reinforce the right-wing shift.

For the UK the danger is that immediate post-referendum tensions turn into longer term pressures. While the Lead for Hate Crime at the NPCC reports that such tensions often dissipate after isolated incidents, the referendum will have long-term consequences during which expectations can be expected to remain high.²³ If unfulfilled in many quarters, even for understandable practical or economic reasons, there is a risk that frustrations may be expressed in yet more violent outpourings against both politicians and foreigners. With the advent of social-media, centrist newspapers, journals, radio and television outlets no longer carry even a fraction of the power to influence and referee public debate that they held at the beginning of the television age.²⁴

In terms of law and order, these pressures will present challenges for police forces that have already seen cuts to budgets, and hence manpower, with further cuts expected. The same can be said of the UK Border Force and its limited resources: it has five ships to patrol the UK's coastline and has had to call on the armed forces who are already undermanned in the naval / marine contingents. There have also been cuts to police marine units. Whatever the policing establishment and the formal disincentives to prevent legal migration, it would be reasonable to expect an increase in illegal migration, probably involving organised crime, with corresponding increase in crime generally. Hence, the demands can only increase and failures exacerbated.

A subsidiary but related issue highlighted by the referendum that has law and order and broader community consequences is the level of dissatisfaction from a growing wealth gap as a result of globalisation, and potential recession. The gap between the richest and poorest parts of Britain is greater than in any other EU country; London's GDP per head is 186% of the European average. Again, if there is not a more equitable and discernible share of national resourcing in the future then failing expectations can be expected to manifest themselves through voting trends, petitions and protest. What is more, the lack of housing for emergency workers in London because of high property prices is a problem, especially if there were a major and prolonged incident that required a prompt and sustained response.

The question therefore is how can cities, corporations and communities make themselves more robust and agile in the face of strains that can divide and sectionalise. The answer lies in prevention not reaction. The latter will demonstrate that the breakdown has already happened to some degree. Early, proactive work on the other hand can help to decrease tensions before they build to dangerous levels. Prevention can take the form of establishing greater community resilience. Resilience means building self-supporting networks and partnerships that will help reinforce connections and strengthen bonds and behaviours. It means understanding and applying the physical, procedural and social enablers that together hold a community in place in the face of shocks or stresses. Building from the ground up, rather than the top down, gives parties a stake in the local community and, much like joining ink dots together, small beginnings can lead to bigger gains.

In the final analysis, defeating repeated acts of terrorism – as well as ethnic hatred – depends above all on a high degree of stoicism and a refusal to allow it to undermine the principles that open societies are built on. This will require a high degree of political leadership.

Summary and Recommendations

This report has attempted to set out at this early stage in the post-Brexit process the key issues that may affect the UK in terms of its security and resilience to shocks and stresses, and in particular those that may arise from repeated terrorist attacks not just in the UK but also to UK interests abroad. The early signs are positive through the declared intention of senior ministers, including the Prime Minister, to continue co-operation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism work in forthcoming negotiations. Other work currently underway through the Lord Harris Review on London's preparedness and the refresh of the national CONTEST strategy should help strengthen the UK's security position. A robust stance, especially if it builds on a sound public-private partnership, will provide better resilience to meet the challenges ahead.

Based on the range of issues identified in this report, 10 recommendations are made:

- 1.** The UK Government should pursue as far as possible continued involvement with EU security institutions, especially Europol.
- 2.** There should be better information sharing between the public and private sectors in order to address any short-, medium- and long-term deficiencies in UK security as a result of Brexit. The key is that successful UK security depends upon a successful economy and thus the safety and security of UK business is critical to overall UK national security interests.
- 3.** The UK public and private sectors should develop a national debate, especially incorporating business representative organisations on the future of UK security.
- 4.** The business sectors should work on enhancing business-to-business (B2B) co-operation both locally and across business peer groups to address any shortfall in UK security as a result of Brexit.
- 5.** Both public and private sectors should vigorously support public / private activities such as 'Stay Safe', Project Griffin and Project Argus and work on the concept of industry delivery.
- 6.** Business should continue to prepare for GDPR and the NIS Directive in May 2018.
- 7.** The UK should prioritise security-related research and innovation, especially in its centres of excellence within UK universities.
- 8.** The UK authorities should take very firm action to counter hate crime and to enhance community resilience.
- 9.** There should be full engagement with the public and private sectors on the follow up to the Lord Harris Review in support of the London Mayor.
- 10.** Both public and private sectors should be prepared to support recommendations from the current CONTEST review which aims to facilitate engagement of the private sector with the recommendations of the CONTEST review.

End notes:

1. London First report 'Security and Resilience Implications of Brexit', Jul 2016. <http://londonfirst.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-Security-and-Resilience-Implications-of-Brexit.pdf>
2. For example, Theresa May, then Home Secretary, in a speech on 25 Apr 2016 (<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-the-uk-eu-and-our-place-in-the-world>); Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, reported in the Daily Mail on 24 Mar 2016 (<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3508737/Met-Police-chief-says-Britain-s-security-risk-rise-Brexit-create-bureaucratic-nightmare.html>); John Sawers, Chief of MI6 from 2009 to 2014 and Jonathan Evans, Director General of MI5 from 2007-2013 (<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spy-chiefs-say-quitting-eu-is-security-risk-fgzgpgkkgk>).
3. Reported in Hansard, 5 Sep 2016 (<https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-09-05/debates/1609055000001/ExitingTheEuropeanUnion>).
4. Ibid.
5. <https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/conservative-party/news/79517/read-full-theresa-mays-conservative>.
6. HM Government, 'National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom' (HM Government, 21 Nov 2015). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015>.
7. Europol, 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016' (Europol, 20 Jul 2016). https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37
8. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summary.pdf
9. European External Action Service, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' (European External Action Service, Jun 2016). <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en>
10. European Commission, 'The European Agenda on Security' (European Commission, 28 Apr 2015). http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/index_en.htm
11. European Commission, 'Towards a "Security Union": Bolstering the EU's Counter-Terrorism Response', EPSC Strategic Notes Issue 12 (European Political Strategy Centre, 20 Apr 2016). http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/notes/sn12_en.htm
12. House of Lords European Union Committee, 'The UK opt-in to the Europol Regulation' (UK Parliament, 2013). <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/lducom/16/1603.htm>
13. Following the announcement in Oct 2016 that a Great Repeal Bill will be introduced in the next parliamentary session, which starts with the Queen's speech in May 2017, it could be that it will be politically possible to postpone this decision. A Great Repeal Act would be used to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and transpose its provisions into British law so that all aspects of EU law can be scrutinised and retained, amended or repealed. The legislation would need to be ready by the day the UK leaves the EU, which is now likely to be before the end of Mar 2019.
14. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/project-griffin>, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/project-argus> <http://www.npcc.police.uk/>

NPCCBusinessAreas/WeaponAttacksStaySafe.aspx

15. K Stoddart, UK cyber security and critical national infrastructure protection, *International Affairs*, Vol 92, No 5, Sep 2016, pp1079-1106.

16. Views expressed under the Chatham House rule at the 'Cyber security: building resilience reducing risk' conference, Chatham House, 19-20 May 2014.

17. K Stoddart, *ibid*.

18. The Chancellor's statement on 13 Aug 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-philip-hammond-guarantees-eu-funding-beyond-date-uk-leaves-the-eu> The statement gives a strong assurance about Horizon2020 funding and also structural funds.

19. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>

20. <http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-undermines-the-diversity-and-tolerance-we-should-instead-be-celebrating-1>

21. Statement by Scotland Yard Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey at a GLA Police and Crime Committee meeting at City Hall on 19 Jul 2016. <http://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s59144/Minutes%20-%20Appendix%201%20-%20Transcript%20of%20QA.pdf>

22. http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/GBR/CERD_C_GBR_CO_21-23_24985_E.pdf See p4, Point 15.

23. Statement by Assistant Chief Constable Mark Hamilton on 27 Jun 2016. <http://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/hate-crime-is-unacceptable-in-any-circumstances-say-police>

24. Rodgers D T, 'How the USA ended up with Trump', *The World Today*, Volume 72, No 5, Oct/Nov 2016, pp14-17.

25. *The Economist*, 17 Sep 2016.



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